A Torturously Failed Occupation

I find it interesting that it takes photographs to prompt the kind of outrage we're seeing around the world over the torture of Iraqi civilians by American and British forces in Iraq. I don't, however, think what prompted international condemnation was the appearance of solid evidence. There has been plenty of solid evidence since the beginning of the occupation that looting, assault, torture, rape and murder are all being committed by the occupation forces, or their hired lackeys. Even I have mentioned these kinds of incidents before, and I have stated that unless they are dealt with in an open manner, where the perpetrators are seen to be punished, these incidents will be a significant factor in the failure of the American project in Iraq.

Robert Fisk of the UK newspaper, the Independent, characterizes the behaviour of American and British forces as a symptom of racism toward Arabs:

Why are we surprised at their racism, their brutality, their sheer callousness towards Arabs? Those American soldiers in Saddam's old prison at Abu Ghraib, those young British squaddies in Basra came -- as soldiers often come -- from towns and cities where race hatred has a home: Tennessee and Lancashire. (for the full article click here)

I wish it was that simple. While I agree that racism plays an important role, the problem is almost entirely a failure of leadership. From the beginning of the occupation the coalition forces have turned a blind eye to deplorable behaviour on the part of a very small number of their troops. It likely started with incidents of looting, where busy officers felt policing their men for what they considered minor infractions of theft would be both a waste of time and possibly harmful to morale.

It then followed that perhaps incidents of overzealous uses of force went unpunished. Perhaps beating a recalcitrant Iraqi detainie to death, or shooting unarmed civilians. The behaviour was likely excused as being brought on by the stress of the situation or the whole Iraq environment.

Soldiers came to learn that they no longer needed to operate with any sense of caution or restraint where Iraqis are concerned, anything goes. Certain ethically challenged soldiers, and by no means the majority of them, seeing that they can literally get away with murder have likely begun pushing the envelope of allowable behaviour.

If rules of engagement and behaviour toward Iraqis can be broken at will, then in practice there really no longer are rules. It then becomes up to each individual soldier to determine what is appropriate behaviour for a situation according to his or her own personal sense of ethics. Many of these soldiers, being in their late teens and early twenties, have at best an immature ethical sense of self, likely falling back on cultural touchstones like movies to determine right and wrong. Here is where the racism, that Robert Fisk brings up earlier, comes into play. But it only comes into play after a failure of leadership on the part of the military command.

In situations of extreme stress and disorder, it becomes immensely important to have clear rules and procedures to follow to help make sense of those situations. This is doubly important for young soldiers who are barely adults. When officers do not punish clearly bad behaviour that breaks those rules, the whole process of decision making is thrown into chaos. It is not only Iraqis who no longer know what to expect in a given encounter with coalition troops, the troops themselves no longer have a clear understanding of what their role is.

It has been clear from the start of the Iraq war that the senior command of both the American and British military did not clearly communicate to their subordinates that every violation be appropriately punished wherever humanly possible. It is also clear that the senior command did not work tirelessly to track down, and publicly punish those responsible for significant violations.

It took the media publishing disgusting photos of torture and abuse at the hands of American military police to create enough of a furor for the US military to take action. But instead of acknowledging a structural problem in command leadership, the military brass have identified a small number of scapegoats that have tarnished their otherwise "sterling" reputation.

These kinds of abuses are only going to get worse. Unless the senior leadership of the military publicly addresses the problems of discipline and the rules of engagement and punishment, neither the troops nor the Iraqis will see any qualitative change in behaviour. Moreover, if the military leadership does not aggressively investigate and actively prosecute all incidents for which they find evidence, the majority of gross violations will go unpunished. Instead of following the rules, the small slice of abusers will simply be a little more careful, because they know only those stupid enough to record what they've done, like those American military police, are going to get caught.

Proper procedure however, should have been in place and rigorously enforced from the start. That it wasn't demonstrates one facet of how poorly the occupation was planned. Now, however, the military has a far larger problem on its hands. Bad behaviour has become entrenched. Getting rid of it is going to be vastly more difficult than preventing it in the first place. But given the behaviour and statements of the Bush Administration in the aftermath of the torture at Abu Ghraib prison, they have no intention of doing anything beyond spinning the appearance of events to minimize negative public reaction. Get ready for more horror.