Unless there are some very serious and wholesale changes in the US approach to its occupation of Iraq, the country will be lost. It may already be too late.
The primary problem as I see it, is one of foundation. By foundation, I mean the bedrock of reasons war on Iraq was declared in the first place. Oil figures as a major element, but it goes far beyond that. The real root of the problem is what David Frum characterizes as the divide between soft and hard power (I'd include a link to Frum's recent book, co-authored with Richard Perle, but I don't want people to waste their money on crap). Hard power is essentially military force, and soft power is diplomatic and/or economic pressure.
Frum seems to believe that under certain circumstances hard power is an effective tool to topple oppressive regimes, and that it should be used to set the stage for democratization. Soft power on the other hand can only work in circumstances where change is already largely afoot in the nation in question.
The real weakness in Frum's approach has two branches. The first is that hard power, by it's very nature murders people. To use murder as a means of control is dastardly. It is an instrument that needs both clear justification, and carefully planned reparation for the people subject to it. We do not live in ancient Rome. Human life has intrinsic value, and to destroy it, must be acknowledged for the horror that it is. To engage in it with merely the trappings of hope for a better future, and no clear and detailed plan, is clearly a crime.
And of course as in all cases of murder, the friends and family of those murdered frequently develop a very deep and personal hatred toward those they see as responsible. This can easily radicalize an otherwise friendly or neutral population to extreme violence. Slaking that thirst for revenge requires both a demonstration of strength and temperance by the occupiers in their day to day control of the country. But they must also show visible progress in improving the lives of those harmed by the occupier's use of hard power.
The other branch of weakness, however, is Frum's apparent misunderstanding of what hard power is. To think the exercise of hard power is merely the use of force to topple a regime is sadly mistaken. In fact, toppling an oppressive regime is merely the beginning of the use of hard power. To effectively control something the size of a nation like Iraq, the hard power used must be extended into an overwhelming presence. The population must believe control can be exerted on a city by city, neighbourhood, by neighbourhood, street by street level. In the case of Iraq, this would require a far, far greater troop presence than what is currently there. And unfortunately exerting that control requires fairly brutal measures, especially initially. Looters for example, must be dispersed, arrested or shot. Curfews must be stringently enforced. The population must be disarmed. But that control must also be exerted on the occupation troops and their collaborators. For example, if American troops loot, or kill civilians indiscriminately, justice must be seen to be done, and the perpetrators must be publicly punished. Otherwise continued criminal behaviour on the part of the occupiers is encouraged, and the local population will lose all confidence in the so-called security being provided. In all likelihood they will begin planning and implementing violent resistance.
Unfortunately, none of the most vital uses of hard power have been used in Iraq. Wholescale looting wasn't just allowed, but it was initially encouraged. Donald Rumsfeld even joked about it at one point after images started appearing repeatedly in the press. American and British troops appear to be
routinely looting, beating and killing Iraqi civilians with little or no consequences. Iraqis are armed to the teeth because they must provide their own security, as the occupation forces do not have the numbers of ground troops to do the job. And after initially disbanding all Iraqi military and police services, the occupation forces have made half-hearted attempts at reorganizing them. Although it appears more to use the Iraqis as human shields against the depredations of both homegrown Iraqi resistance, and foreign Muslim militants flocking to Iraq to fight the infidel.
But another major flaw in Frum's arguments is his failure to recognize that even a properly executed use of hard power is not enough. A detailed plan of reconstruction must be ready to be implemented as soon as the regime is toppled. Moreover, the vast majority involved in that reconstruction must be Iraqis themselves, particularly those with previous employment in the areas being reconstructed. The reasons for this are numerous. Iraqis would be most familiar with existing infrastructure, and what needs to be repaired. Iraqis would be most familiar with the needs of Iraqis. But perhaps most important of all, unemployed Iraqis would be unable to provide for their families. Unemployment would likely lead them into criminal activities to provide for themselves and their families, and possibly active violent resistance.
Again few of the needs for reconstruction seem to have been met. The first few months of the occupation the US seemed to have absolutely no plan. Looting was widespread, in fact many government buildings were burned. The Americans seemed paralyzed by the lack of rejoicing and flower throwing by the bulk of Iraqis after the fall of Saddam.
Gigantic contracts have been going to American companies but little money has been going to Iraqis. Estimates of Iraqi unemployment are as high as
70% in the mainstream US press, which is likely a gross underestimate of the true numbers. The occupation forces seem more concerned with giving plumb contracts to their corporate sponsors who then vastly overcharge for incompetent work. Reestablishing water, sewer and electrical services, without which a modern society cannot function, has been largely a failure.
The United States is no stranger to occupation and reconstruction. Two examples of just how good a job can be done to rebuild a former enemy power can be found in post-World War II West Germany and Japan. Admittedly the Americans and their allies adopted the Marshall Plan primarily as a defense against the Soviets. But their efforts in those two nations were spectacularly successful.
They were successful not simply because they focused on defanging West Germany's and Japan's military capacity, but because they invested a massive amount of money and resources into rebuilding their infrastructure and economies. They created protected structures for fragile industries, an anathema to the free market thinking of the Bush Administration. They gave control of much of the reconstruction to the local population, instead of giving it in the form of pork-barrel contracts to military service providers like Haliburton. And they had clear plans in place to hand democratic government power over to the local population.
The complexity of Iraq should have given the Bush Administration pause. The project of toppling a regime, and rebuilding a country, is not a corporate hostile take over. It is war. It demands immense sacrifice of blood and national treasure. It requires a commitment of decades of effort. Instead the Bush Administration approached Iraq with the same set of beliefs that they approach free market enterprise. They believe markets take care of themselves. The invisible hand of the market magically adjusts to the whipsaw of events, and the efforts of enterprising individuals provides all the ingenuity needed. Who else but a bunch of pampered elites, whose power and wealth was provided by familial connections and inherited money, could believe things could be so easy?